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Abstract 
This paper presents the difference in the likelihood of being targets or acquirers among stand-
alone banks, single-bank holding company (SBHC) affiliates and multi-bank holding 
company (MBHC) affiliates. Using a sample of U.S. commercial bank data from 1997 to 
2012, we find that MBHC affiliates exhibit a greater likelihood of being targets than do 
stand-alone commercial banks, while stand-alone banks have a greater probability of 
becoming targets than do SBHC affiliates. On the other hand, our findings show that MBHC 
affiliates tend to have a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do SBHC affiliates, which 
again have a greater probability of being acquirers than do stand-alone banks. Those banks 
that acquire another bank within the same MBHC structure tend to be smaller and more 
financially constrained than those banks acquiring outside the same MBHC structure, 
whereas targets that are acquired by another bank within the same MBHC structure tend to be 
smaller, higher profitability and capital than targets that are acquired by banks from outside 
the MBHC structure. Our results suggest that the MBHC parent attempts to discipline 
distressed, poorly performing and smaller affiliates by involving them in mergers and 
acquisitions.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the Riegle-Neal Act was passed in 1994 and became fully effective in 1997, the 
number of U.S. commercial banks has declined from a peak of 10,452 at the end of 1994 to 
approximately 5,705 in September 20142. Using a sample of 3,903 takeovers, the pace of 
extensive mergers in the U.S. banking industry has been impressive, with 3,447 
(approximately 88.32%) bank holding company (BHC) affiliates being acquired in contrast 
with fewer than 500 stand-alone bank acquisitions between 1997 and 2012. Among them, 
BHC acquirers conducted 3,891 (approximately 98.41%) merger transactions. Moreover, the 
expansion strategies based on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) with conglomerate targets 
and conglomerate acquirers have been remarkable during the last two decades. Song (1982) 
suggests that a different organizational structure indicates a specific organizational ability to 
implement a specific diversification strategy. The motives behind M&A among stand-alone 
commercial banks and BHC affiliates, however, have attracted modest attention whether their 
pattern of diversification is the result of the organizational structure. We attempt to provide 
more evidence to the literature on conglomerate banking structure in this paper.  
Examining the differences in merger strategies of stand-alone banks, single-bank holding 
company (SBHC) affiliates, and multi-bank holding company (MBHC) affiliates allows us to 
provide unique insights into these M&A decisions. First, as of 2012, BHC as a group 
controlled over $15 trillion in total assets, which is more than 95% of all U.S. banking assets 
(Avraham et al. 2012). On the other hand, the stand-alone commercial bank model is 
disappearing. To explain the restructuring of the U.S. banking industry, it is important to 
examine the research on M&A. Second, understanding the reality of the “eat-or-be-eaten” 
scenario is important with respect to merger waves, where the regime shifts the incentives for 
M&A transactions (Gorton et al. 2009). Third, the understanding of different acquisition 
choices to acquire or to be acquired among stand-alone commercial banks and BHC affiliates 
may provide an implication for the regulators to anticipate the potential of future mergers and 
to adopt new policies to encourage or ban these M&A deals.  Forth, the likelihood of M&As 
in the banking industry could be motivated by different reasons during the crisis and pre-
crisis period. Dam and Koetter (2012) argue that when the consequence of bank risk is 
revealed, the regulator will declare the bank in distress and may decide the bank either a 
bailout or an exit in the form of restructuring merger. Hence, this study plays an important 
role in analysing a reason behind an acquisition in an attempt of preventing either bank 
failures or the extent of government interventions.  
                                                          
2 The number of banks over these years is obtained from the FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking, 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2014sep/fdic.html 
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We propose two hypotheses. First, the failing hypothesis posits that distressed firms are 
more likely to be targets of takeovers (Khatami et al. 2015, Palepu 1986, Hasbrouck 1985, 
Schwartz 1982). A substantial amount of literature (Peel and Wilson 1989, Pastena and 
Ruland 1986, Bulow and John 1978, Lee and Barker 1977, Higgins and Schall 1975) further 
suggests that a merger is a substitute for bankruptcy. Possible explanations suggest that 
financially distressed target firms tend to be successfully restructured after a merger (Erel et 
al. 2015, Clark and Ofek 1994) or that the target firm’s shareholders could receive more 
benefits from a merger decision than from a bankruptcy decision (Pastena and Ruland 1986, 
Clark and Weinstein 1983, Shrieves and Stevens 1979). Furthermore, acquirers find it easier 
to merge and gain more operating synergies by acquiring risky targets (Bruton et al. 1994, 
Barney 1991, Harrison et al. 1991, Chatterjee 1986). Therefore, if a distressed firm can 
generate a greater value as a going concern than through liquidation and if a bidder provides 
this firm with a special competence, then risky firms are more likely to become targets 
(Bruton et al. 1994, Israel 1991). As argued by Ly et al. (2015), the structure of SBHCs 
contributes to the safety of their affiliates through an internal capital market; however, the 
increasingly complex structure of MBHCs exposes MBHC affiliates to a higher level of 
bankruptcy than do stand-alone banks. Accordingly, they find evidence that MBHC affiliates 
tend to have the highest level of insolvency risk, while SBHC affiliates have the least 
insolvency risk and stand-alone commercial banks have an intermediate level of insolvency 
risk. Therefore, we postulate that MBHC affiliates tend to have the greatest probability of 
becoming targets, while SBHC affiliates have the least probability of being acquired and 
stand-alone commercial banks fall somewhere between. 
Second, the probability of SBHC affiliates, MBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks 
becoming acquirers centres on the fundamental differences in the characteristics of those 
SBHC and MBHC affiliates that choose to diversify and those stand-alone counterparts that 
choose to remain focused. From the resource-based perspective of corporate diversification, 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) indicate that diversified firms may own excess capacity in 
resources to fund their needs for economic activities compared to focused firms. However, 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) argue that the potential costs related to diversified business 
operations determine the benefits of maintaining a specialized entity. Therefore, on the one 
hand, we argue that SBHC and MBHC affiliates have more internal resources to enhance 
their merger activities than do stand-alone banks. On the other hand, stand-alone banks tend 
to be focused enterprises, thus preventing agency problems. Taken together, our arguments 
suggest that SBHC and MBHC affiliates are more likely to become acquirers than are stand-
alone banks.  
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We use a sample of U.S. commercial banks between 1997 and 2012 with accounting 
data obtained from Call Reports and M&A data retrieved from Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation sources to test the two hypotheses. MBHC affiliates tend to exhibit a greater 
likelihood of being targets than do stand-alone commercial banks, which, in turn, exhibit a 
greater likelihood of being targets than do SBHC affiliates. On the other hand, our findings 
indicate that MBHC affiliates tend to exhibit a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do 
SBHC affiliates, which, in turn, exhibit a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do stand-
alone banks. These two main results support both hypotheses.  
According to Park and Hendry (2015), Cox proportional hazard model carries built-in 
assumption that the effect of a covariate on the hazard rate is constant. If such an effect 
differs over time, the regression will lead to biased coefficient estimates. Therefore, an 
increased application of plotting methods and Schoenfeld residual-based nonproportionality 
tests is recommended to investigate the trends of covariate-specific scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals over time. If the test reveals that the proportional hazard assumption is violated, 
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) recommend to interact those violating variables with the 
function of time as a corrective techniques. In this study, hence, we employ Schoenfeld 
residual-based nonproportionality tests and plotting graphs to detect violations of the 
proportional hazard assumption and corrective models are included to achieve greater 
accurate assessment of covariate effects. We find consistent results for the likelihood of 
targets and acquirers when examining the financial crisis period between 2007 and 2009, 
splitting samples based on the asset size and analysing the too-big-to-fail issues.  
Gertner et al. (1994) argue that conglomeration could be value enhancing. Comparing 
internal and external capital markets, they argue that conglomerates provide more advantages 
than do banks to redeploy efficiently those assets that are performing poorly. Therefore, we 
examine further insights into the MBHC motives of MBHCs to engage in M&As within the 
same structure by conducting three probit model analyses. First, we compare the financial 
characteristics between acquirers who acquire another bank within the same MBHC structure 
and acquirers who acquire another bank outside the same MBHC structure. We find that 
those banks that acquire another bank within the same MBHC structure tend to be smaller 
and more financially constrained than those banks acquiring a bank from outside the same 
MBHC structure. Second, we investigate the differences in financial characteristics between 
targets who are acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure and targets who are 
acquired by another bank from outside the same MBHC structure. Our findings suggest that 
targets that are acquired by another bank within the same MBHC structure tend to be smaller, 
higher profitability and capital than targets that are acquired by banks from outside the 
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MBHC structure. Third, we study the determinants of the likelihood of being targets among 
MBHC affiliates. Our findings suggest that the MBHC parents attempt to discipline 
distressed, poorly performing, and smaller affiliates by involving them in mergers and 
acquisitions. Overall, the MBHC parents attempt to replicate the M&A strategy within the 
MBHCs to reduce transaction costs, to refocus and to increase the overall performances of 
the MBHCs at the parent level.  
Our paper contributes to multiple strands of the literature. First, the M&A literature on 
banking provides a variety of studies on the motivation for M&A (Mehran and Thakor 2011, 
Koetter et al. 2007, Amel et al. 2004, Berger et al. 1999, Hadlock et al. 1999, Rose 1995), on 
the comparison of financial characteristics between acquiring banks and acquired banks 
(Fried et al. 1999) and on the probability of becoming a target (Wheelock and Wilson 2000, 
Hannan and Pilloff 2009). We contribute to the M&A literature on the differences with 
respect to the probabilities of being targets or acquirers among BHC affiliates and stand-
alone commercial banks. Specifically, Wheelock and Wilson (2004) examine the constraints 
on consolidation within the same structure and investigate the regulatory constraints that 
influence merger activities outside the structure using U.S. bank level data of MBHC banks 
and non-MBHC banks. This paper extends the study of Wheelock and Wilson (2004) by 
providing direct evidence and deeper insight into the motivation of MBHCs to engage in 
M&A within the structure. Second, this study extends the substantial literature that compares 
stand-alone and BHC affiliates. However, the extant literature primarily focuses on bank 
performance before and after the acquisition (Pozdena 1988, Mayne 1977, Piper and Weiss 
1974, Ware 1973, Talley 1972), on cost efficiency (Yamori et al. 2003, Rose and Scott 1979) 
and on dividend policy (Mayne 1980).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, 
while Section 3 describes the data used and methodologies employed in this study. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
2 Hypothesis development 
 
2.1 The probability of becoming a target 
The literature has suggested that takeover targets are firms with prior poor 
performances (Palepu 1986, Hasbrouck 1985, Schwartz 1982) or failing firms (Hirshleifer 
and Thakor 1992). However, an acquisition of a distressed bank that is attractive both to the 
distressed firm itself and to the acquirer is based on the probability that a value-increasing 
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acquisition may materialize and that the division of the synergy gains accrued positively 
impact both acquirers and targets (Bruton et al. 1994, Israel 1991).  
It is well known that distressed firms may not be able to raise equity (Fluck and Lynch 
1999) or finance debt (Fluck 1998). In the investigations of firms attempting to recover from 
their financial constraints, several studies (Jame 1996, Gertner and Scharfstein 1991, 
Grossman and Hart 1980) have found that distressed firms fail to renegotiate with their 
debtholders. In the study of a 1960s conglomerate wave, Hubbard and Pahlia (1999) find that 
distressed target firms seeking financial synergy are involved in the diversification of 
acquisitions. Therefore, the focus is on the fact that a merger is the best choice for facilitating 
the financing mechanism that could not be achieved as a stand-alone entity (Erel et al. 2015, 
Fluck and Lynch 1999).  
A substantial number of studies (Peel and Wilson 1989, Pastena and Ruland 1986, 
Bulow and John 1978, Lee and Barker 1977, Higgins and Schall 1975) further suggests that a 
merger is a substitute for bankruptcy. Indeed, financially distressed target firms tend to be 
successfully restructured after a merger (Erel et al. 2015, Clark and Ofek 1994). Similarly, 
another line of argumentation (Pastena and Ruland 1986, Clark and Weinstein 1983, Shrieves 
and Stevens 1979) supports merger over bankruptcy as the target firm’s shareholders benefit 
more from a merger because they can retain their shares that hold some positive value. In 
contrast, the shareholders may receive nothing under a corporate bankruptcy. Therefore, 
Khatami et al. (2015) conclude that financial constraints of targets play an important role in 
value creation for both bidders and targets and influence the determinants of a takeover bid. 
On the other hand, Pastena and Ruland (1986) argue that the literature treats a merger 
as an alternative solution to bankruptcy under the assumption that distressed firms are able to 
identify potential acquirers. In essence, Gorton et al. (2009) provide the definition for 
positioning acquisitions such that firms position themselves to be perceived as more attractive 
takeover targets to gain takeover premia. In the study on the success of restructuring, Clark 
and Ofek (1994) find that acquirers tend to earn higher post-merger returns from restructuring 
financially distressed targets compared to earnings from restructuring non- distressed targets 
due to the concessions they are able to gain when acquiring distressed firms.  
Among the explanations for why distressed firms are attractive targets to buyers, a 
prominent explanation advanced by Oster (1990) is the so-called winner’s curse, which is an 
error that acquirers pay more than the future value of the targets. Roll (1986) reasons that 
acquirers underestimate the cost of enhancing the combined synergies of two firms prior to an 
acquisition. A possible reason for this, as argued by several studies (Bruton et al. 1994, 
Barney 1991, Harrison et al. 1991, Dundas and Richardson 1982), is that acknowledging the 
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distressed conditions of the targets provides acquirers a more thorough study in estimating 
their true values, thus providing them the chance to avoid the winner’s curse. Accordingly, 
Chatterjee (1986) concludes that acquirers find it easier and gain more operating synergies 
when acquiring risky targets.  
Taken together, on the one hand, the failing hypothesis yields the testable prediction 
that if a distressed firm can generate a greater value as a going concern than can liquidation 
and if a bidder should be found to provide these firms with a special competence, then a risky 
bank is more likely to become a target. On the other hand, as argued by Ly et al. (2015), 
while the structure of SBHCs contributes to the safety of their affiliates in the internal capital 
market, the increasingly complex structure of MBHCs exposes MBHC affiliates to a higher 
level of bankruptcy than that of stand-alone banks. They further find that MBHC affiliates 
tend to have the highest level of insolvency risk, that SBHC affiliates have the lowest level of 
insolvency risk, and that stand-alone commercial banks have an intermediate level of 
insolvency risk. Therefore, we postulate the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: MBHC affiliates tend to have the greatest probability of becoming 
targets, while SBHC affiliates exhibit the lowest probability of being acquired and stand-
alone commercial banks are somewhere between the two.  
 
2.2 The probability of becoming an acquirer 
As acquisition is an investment decision made by an acquiring firm (Hornstein and 
Nguyen 2014, Halpern 1982), the probability of being an acquirer among all SBHC affiliates, 
MBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks centres on the fundamental differences in the 
characteristics of those SBHC and MBHC affiliates that choose to diversify and those stand-
alone counterparts that opt to remain focused.  
From the resource-based perspective of corporate diversification, Martin and Sayrak 
(2003) indicate that diversified firms may own more capacity in resources to fund their needs 
for economic activities than do focused firms. Indeed, the capital structures of SBHC and 
MBHC affiliates are richer than those of stand-alone banks because the holding company 
structure provides the former with funding advantages in the internal capital markets (Baule 
2014, Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006, Khanna and Yafeh 2005), while stand-alone banks are 
not able to borrow as much as they need due to the imperfect external capital market (Deloof 
1998, Hoshi et al. 1991). With a rich internal resource, SBHC and MBHC banks have the 
capacity to do a better job of project selection, or so-called winner picking, and thus enhance 
their value (Stein 1997, Weston 1970, Freixas et al. 2007) as compared to stand-alone banks. 
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Dahl and Shrieves (1989) argue that acquisitions made by BHCs may contribute to an 
efficient reallocation of the surplus capital to other banks under the imperfect condition that 
limits the size of the capital and the access to the capital in the capital market.  
Similar to the advantage of the superior internal resource mechanism, Teece (1982) 
emphasizes the distinctive capabilities of conglomerates in evaluating investment 
opportunities. Teece (1982) finds that the capabilities of conglomerates enhance their 
assessment of acquisition candidates. Hence, Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) conclude that 
family firms outperform non-family firms in M&A. However, to disentangle the 
organizational forms of the MBHC from SBHC, Rangan et al. (1989) argue that MBHCs may 
be preferred over SBHCs as a vehicle for diversification strategies at higher output levels 
because the former can achieve higher cost efficiency than can the latter. 
On the other hand, Haunschild (1993) suggests that the parents are motivated to engage 
in conglomerate acquisitions as a conglomeration allows them to offset a poorly performing 
business with a better performing business (Amihud and Lev 1981). In fact, Hughes et al. 
(1999) and Deng and Elyasiani (2008) find evidence that MBHCs tend to operate over greater 
geographic distances when acquiring other banks. 
In defence of conglomerates, as postulated by Williams (1975), however, there is an 
optimal trade-off between the breadth of information (conglomerates) and the depth of 
expertise (specialized firms). Martin and Sayrak (2003) argue that the potential costs related 
to diversified business operations determine the benefits of maintaining a specialized entity. 
The opponents of corporate diversification propose that the root of the problem is a 
managerial agency problem. If a diversified structure reflects agency problems between the 
parent and the managers of the subsidiaries, an internal capital market may provide SBHC 
and MBHC affiliates with a greater opportunity to over invest (Ferris et al. 2003, Perotti and 
Gelfer 2001, Rajan et al. 2000, Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Shin and Stulz 1998). However, 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) argue that a diversified structure makes it difficult to overcome 
agency problems. In related studies, Lang and Stulz (1994) find that diversified firms 
demonstrate poor performance prior to conglomeration, while Hyland and Diltz (2002) and 
Mueller (1969) further provide evidence that poorly performing conglomerate firms tend to 
adopt a merger strategy to acquire the related growth opportunities. Based on the fundamental 
argument regarding the cost of diversification incurred by agency problems, stand-alone 
banks prefer to stay focused rather than to expand their structure via M&A. Thus, we posit 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: SBHC and MBHC affiliates are more likely to be acquirers than are 
stand-alone banks. 
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3 Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data sample 
Berger et al. (1995) suggest that BHC structure has been advantageous since the 
Riegle-Neal Insterstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 deregulated interstate 
branching regulation. Stiroh (2000) states that 83% of the U.S. banking assets were held by 
BHCs as of year-end 1997. Since the Riegle-Neal Act was passed in 1994 and became fully 
effective in 1997, M&A opportunities have accelerated consolidation in the U.S. banking 
industry. Therefore, our yearly account data of commercial banks are from 1997 to 2012. 
Accounting data are retrieved from Call Reports while M&A data are accessed from Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation sources.    
Table 1 reports the distribution of acquirers and targets. As shown in Panel A of Table 
1, the number of MBHC affiliates being targets holds the highest proportion of total targets 
(3,903), which includes stand-alone banks (456), SBHC affiliates (1,017) and MBHC 
affiliates (2,430) (11.68%, 26.06%, 62.26%, respectively). The acquirers reported in Panel A 
of Table 1 are counted by the number of M&A transactions conducted to acquire a certain 
type of target. It indicates that acquirers who are MBHC affiliates take the largest proportion 
of transactions at 80.84%, or 3,159 out of 3,903 M&A deals. Panel B shows the distribution 
of 1,124 acquirers within the same MBHCs, while Panel C presents the distribution of 1,865 
targets within the same MBHCs.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for target and acquirer samples. In the last column, 
the letters "a", "b" and "c" indicate a significant difference between the means of each pair at 
the 1% level as follows: \ (i) SBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks, (ii) MBHC affiliates and 
stand-alone banks and (iii) MBHC affiliates and SBHC affiliates. As indicated in the last 
column of Table 2, most variables exhibit significantly different means for the three pairs.  
Regarding the target sample, MBHC affiliates are riskier than are stand-alone banks 
and SBHC affiliates. SBHC and MBHC affiliates are larger, have a lower level of capital, 
exhibit a larger proportion of off-balance sheet (OBS) items, real estate loans, multi-family 
mortgages, and are more cost efficient than stand-alone banks. MBHC affiliates are larger, 
have higher levels of capital, real estate loans,  and multi-family mortgages, however, lower 
deposit and liquidity, and  are more cost efficient than SBHC affiliates.  
With respect to the acquirer sample, SBHC affiliates tend to have higher Z-scores than 
do MBHC affiliates, which, in turn, have higher Z-scores than do stand-alone banks. SBHC 
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affiliates are smaller, hold lower capital resources and liquidity. However they have higher 
proportions of deposits real-estate loans and multi-family mortgages than do stand-alone 
banks. MBHC affiliates are larger, have less capital and higher real estate loans and multi-
family mortgages but lower deposit and liquidity values than do stand-alone banks. MBHC 
affiliates are larger, have less in deposits, lower real estate loan values and low liquidity, but 
are more likely to be involved in OBS activities and more cost efficient than SBHC affiliates.  
Appendix A presents the correlation matrix for variables used in the study. In general, 
there are no high correlations between/among explanatory variables.  
 
3.2 Cox proportional hazards model 
We employ Cox (1972) proportional hazard duration models with time-varying 
covariates to examine the likelihood of banks being targets or acquirers during the period 
from 1997 to 2012. The survival analysis approach is typically appropriate for this empirical 
analysis because the sequential nature of the data is taken into account and it can cope with 
censoring and incorporate time-variant covariates (Holmen and Nivorozhkin 2007). Our two 
events are mutually exclusive as the choice of being acquired or being an acquirer cannot 
occur simultaneously. This method is applicable to the modelling of survival time as the time 
to be acquired or to acquire may vary based on the eventual outcome for a specific period. 
Following Hannan and Pilloff (2009) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000), this relationship is 
presented as follows: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡|𝑋𝑖(𝑡)) =  ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) 
where ℎ𝑗  is the hazard function of bank i and ℎ0 is an unspecified baseline hazard. The 
expression exp (𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) is the systematic part of the hazard function, where 𝑋𝑖(𝑡) defines the 
vector of covariates applying to bank i and 𝛽 denotes the coefficient vector.  
In our context, we work with two distinct hazard rates corresponding to the two types 
of acquisitions, namely, target and acquirer, by three types of commercial banks, namely, 
stand-alone banks, SBHC affiliates and MBHC affiliates, according to two proportional 
hazard models: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼1𝑆𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +  𝛼3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (1) 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 =  𝛽1𝑆𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜋𝑖𝑡              (2) 
where SBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are SBHC affiliates, and 0 otherwise. 
MBHC_affiliate equals 1 if the banks are MBHC affiliates, and 0 otherwise. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 denote the error terms. 
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The effects of the explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are incorporated by allowing the hazard 
function to be influenced proportionally by the covariates as follows: 
 In the investigation of the likelihood of being targets, we use Z-score, , equity/assets, 
size, deposits, OBS activities, cost-to-income ratio, real estate loans, multi-family mortgages 
and liquidity. Z-score is equal to equity/assets plus ROA divided by standard deviation of 
ROA. The standard deviation of ROA is calculated at the four-year rolling time. A substantial 
literature suggests that distressed firms are more likely to become takeover targets (Khatami 
et al. 2015, Palepu 1986, Hasbrouck 1985, Schwartz 1982). Hence, it is predicted that banks 
with lower Z-scores are more likely to become targets. Following Pasiouras et al. (2007), for 
this study, we adopted capital strength as measured by equity to total assets. Moore (1996) 
argues that banks with a lack of capital strength tend to attract acquirers who are able to inject 
capital into the acquired banks. Therefore, we expect that banks holding lower capital 
resources are more likely to be targets.  
Bank size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Wheelock and Wilson 
(2004) suggest that the probability of involvement in mergers increases with bank size. 
Deposit refers to the ratio of deposits to total assets and thus captures the composition of the 
bank’s liabilities. While banks find it costly to issue new capital (Myers and Majluf 1984), 
acquiring banks absorb deposit sources held by potential targets (Wheelock and Wilson 2004) 
by cross-selling to newly acquired local depositors (Rieker 2006). Wheelock and Wilson 
(2004) find that an increase in deposits increases the chance of being acquired.  
The OBS is calculated by OBS items divided by total assets. Hannan and Pilloff (2009) 
suggest that the degree to which banks engage in OBS activities may affect their probability 
of being acquired. Cost-to-income ratio, which is defined as the operating expense or non-
interest expense divided by the operating income, is the proxy for capturing operating 
efficiency management (Wheelock and Wilson 2000).  They argue that the likelihood of 
acquisition declines with cost inefficiency. Cole and Fenn (2008) argue that real estate loans 
is the main factor of bank failures, therefore, we control the ratio of real estate loans to total 
assets in our study in an attempt to capture its mediation effect in the association of bank 
failure and M&As.  As argued by Diamond and Rajan (2005), liquidity and solvency problem 
can interact and become the cause of banking crises, hence, it is important to control for 
liquidity in this study. Liquidity proxy is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets in which 
liquid assets contain cash, available-for-sale securities and Federal funds sold.  
The same set of control variables is employed in the analysis for the likelihood of being 
acquirers. The synergy and internalization hypothesis (Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou 
2013, Eun 1996) suggests that acquisition is motivated by the acquirer’s desire to redeploy 
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the combined assets or to acquire and internalize the operating synergies obtained from the 
target, such as larger economies of scale to generate synergistic gains. However, Masulis et 
al. (2007) argue that large banks are more entrenched and more likely to engage in value-
reducing acquisitions. The contradictory view of the synergy and internalization hypothesis 
predicts that capital-starved banks are more likely to be acquirers. Additionally, the efficient 
management hypothesis (Hannan and Pilloff 2009, Roll 1986, Manne 1965, Marris 1963) 
offers an opposite prediction, that is, that cost-efficient banks tend to be acquirers.  
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 The likelihood of being targets 
 
4.1.1 Main findings 
By employing the Cox model, one should be aware as to whether the model’s 
proportional hazard assumption that independent variables are proportional over time is met. 
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) argue that the violation of such an assumption may 
produce biased and inefficient estimates. Following Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001), we 
deal with such an issue by first identifying violating variables after running the original 
model and then re-estimating the model again with the inclusion of interaction terms between 
each of violating variables and the log of time. These interaction terms take into account the 
nonproportional effects of those violating variables, resulting in a better-specified model and 
greater accuracy in assessing covariate effects. The results are interpreted by using the 
corrected model.  
Table 3 reports the main results from the Cox proportional hazard estimation model 
(1). A negative (positive) coefficient indicates that an explanatory variable is related to a 
decrease (increase) in the acquisition hazard, defined as the likelihood of being acquired, 
given that it has not been acquired until the observed point in time. As indicated in Model (1), 
the negatively significant coefficient for SBHC_affiliate (-0.11) in the first column of Table 3 
suggests that SBHC affiliates are less likely to be acquired than are stand-alone banks. We 
also find a positive and significant coefficient for MBHC_affiliate (1.58), indicating that 
MBHC affiliates are more likely to be acquired than are stand-alone banks. These results are 
consistent with our first hypothesis and are also consistent with the finding of Ly et al. (2015) 
that MBHC affiliates tend to have the highest level of insolvency risk, SBHC affiliates have 
the least insolvency risk, and stand-alone commercial banks demonstrate an intermediate 
level of insolvency risk. SBHC affiliates can access less restricted funds in the internal capital 
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market established by their parent (Houston and James 1998, Houston et al. 1997) in contrast 
to stand-alone banks. Moreover, efficient internal capital market models suggest that 
diversification creates value (Rajan et al. 2000). Diversification at the parent level enhances 
SBHCs’ ability to obtain better external financing deals to enrich the internal financing 
available to their subsidiaries (Khanna and Palepu 2000), thereby increasing the ability of the 
parent to relieve financial difficulties faced by their affiliates. Hence, SBHC affiliates have 
lower insolvency risk than stand-alone banks, all else being equal.  
 In the wake of deregulation, BHCs have become more organizationally complex over 
the past two decades in terms of the number of separate legal affiliates and their geographic 
locations (Avraham et al. 2012). On the one hand, complexity theory argues that agency 
problems between the managers of the MBHC’s parent and affiliates in the organizational 
hierarchy structure decrease the investment efficiency of subsidiaries (Rajan et al. 2000, 
Scharfstein and Stein 2000). On the other hand, complexity theory suggests that organizations 
employing a complex adaptive system model (Anderson 1999, Arthur 1996, Cheng and Van 
de Ven 1996) behave in a manner whereby each subsidiary bank competes with the others for 
internal resources (Frankel 2013). Complexity theory, hence, centres on the limited ability of 
the parent equitably provide resources for all of its subsidiaries as BHCs adopt increasingly 
complex structures due to diversification (Kahn and Winton 2004, DeYoung 2003, Hughes et 
al. 1999). Therefore, MBHC affiliates have higher insolvency risk than stand-alone banks. 
The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that risky firms are more likely to 
be takeover targets (Palepu 1986, Hasbrouck 1985, Schwartz 1982). If a distressed firm can 
generate a greater value as a going concern than can liquidation, and if a bidder is able to 
provide this firm with a special competence, then a merger is a good substitute for bankruptcy 
(Peel and Wilson 1989, Pastena and Ruland 1986, Bulow and John 1978, Lee and Barker 
1977, Higgins and Schall 1975). Overall, MBHC affiliates tend to exhibit a greater likelihood 
of being targets than do stand-alone commercial banks, which, in turn, have a greater 
likelihood of being targets than do SBHC affiliates3. 
The positive sign of size (0.11) suggests that acquirers tend to acquire larger banks, a 
finding that is consistent with Eun (1996), who finds that acquisition is motivated by the 
acquirer’s desire to redeploy the combined assets or acquire and internalize the operating 
synergies. Our results indicate that deposit, multi-family mortgages and liquidity increase the 
likelihood of becoming targets. Banks with a higher proportion of deposits are more likely to 
be acquired, whereas the acquiring banks would absorb the deposit sources held by the 
                                                          
3 We employ three different methods, Poisson, Kaplan-Meier and Standard Mortality Ratio for robustness 
checks and all the results hold. This evidence can be provided upon the request. 
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potential targets (Wheelock and Wilson 2004). We find that banks with higher proportion of 
real estate loans are less likely to become targets, demonstrating that acquirers may not find 
interest in acquiring banks with risky real estate loan portfolio. This finding is consistent with 
the conclusion of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) that banks owning suspect loans measured by 
high ratio of real estate loans to total asset are less likely to become targets.  
Table 4 reports the results of Schoenfeld residual-based nonproportionality tests from 
models obtained from Table 3. ρ indicates the estimated correlation between scaled 
Schoenfeld residuals and ln(Time). Columns with χ2 and p-value report the confidence that 
we will reject the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio of the covariate is constant over time. 
More specifically for Model (1) column 3, p-values of size (0.00), cost-to-income (0.00), real 
estate loans (0.09) and liquidity (0.05) suggest that size, cost-to-income, real estate mortgages 
and liquidity do not have a proportional influence on the likelihood of being targets. The 
global test of model (1) shows that non-proportionality is present. 
Appendix B1 supplements the relative graphical approach for model 1 of Table 3 by 
plotting the scaled Schoenfeld residuals against ln(time)4. Each plot contains the fitted line 
and a lowness smooth line to facilitate observations of residuals’ trends. Box-Steffensmeier 
and Zorn (2001)  document that if a variable is proportional, the two lines are supposed to be 
close to each other and the average values of residuals should be zero throughout any point of 
time. One can observe that this pattern is generally true for most of variables apart from size, 
cost-to-income and real estate mortgages. The negative slope at the end of the line is 
observed for size, by contrast positive ones are observed for cost-to-income and real estate 
mortgages. The negative (positive) slope implies a tendency to overpredict (underpredict) its 
effect in the earlier duration and underestimate (overestimate) them in later years.  
The re-estimate of the interactive model is presented in Model 2 of Table 3 column 2. 
Doing so provides a complete and accurate picture of the true effect of these variables on the 
hazard over the duration. Consistent with earlier results reported for Model 1 in Table 3, we 
can see that SBHC affiliates are less likely to be acquired than are stand-alone banks while 
MBHC affiliates are more likely to become targets than their stand-alone counterparts.  
Jackson et al. (2014) document that the standard approach for fitting the Cox 
proportional hazard model is based on the censoring assumption. Following Foster and Jones 
(2001), we plot the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals to evaluate the general fit of the Cox 
model. They suggest that cumulative Cox-Snell residuals that resemble a (censored) sample 
from a standard exponential distribution should lie on a 450 line if there is a correctly fitted 
                                                          
4 To save space, plots of scaled Schoenfeld residuals from other models are not reported.  
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model. Appendix B2 yields cumulative Cox-Snell residuals obtained from Model (1) of Table 
3. It can be seen that the model provides a fairly good fit as the residuals lie close to the 450 
line. Therefore, random censoring is not a concern in our model. 
 
4.1.2 Financial crisis 2007-2009 
As our data sample cover the financial crisis period between 2007 and 2009, one may 
suspect whether our M&A results are due to the probability of failure during the crisis. We 
examine this by first dropping all observations from 2007 to 2009 and then re-estimated the 
model by focusing on the remainder of the sample. Similar findings are found as reported 
Model (3) and (4) of Table 3. Hence, the probability of bank failure during the crisis does not 
affect our main finding.  
 
4.1.3 Asset size class and too-big-to-fail 
Gong and Jones (2013) find that there is a three-tiered bailout policy in which 
government rescues a bank with large systemic impact (‘too-big-to-fail’). The policy is 
optimal if the government randomizes bailout for moderate-impact banks (‘constructive 
ambiguity’) and may not rescue banks with minimal systemic consequences (‘too small to 
save’). Their evidence shows that size matters when studying bank failure. In this section, we 
re-examine the likelihood of being targets across different size classes and attempt to provide 
more insight into the too-big-to-fail issues associated with M&A.  
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we split the sample by asset size into three 
sub-samples: (i) less than $1 billion, (ii) between $1 billion and $3 billion and (iii) larger than 
$3 billion. As presented in Model (5)-(10) in Table 3, similar findings of positive and 
significant MBHC_affiliate coefficients are found across different asset size classes, 
suggesting that MBHC affiliates tend to have higher likelihood of being targets than stand-
alone banks regardless of their bank size. However, the results of SBHC_affiliate coefficients 
are insignificant in Model (7)-(10) for the medium and large asset class, indicating that 
SBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks are equally likely to be acquired when they are larger 
than $1 billion.  Putting forward argument of Gong and Jones (2013), one possible reason can 
be that when systemic impacts of SBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks become larger, they 
tend to receive government intervention, causing indifferent likelihood of being targets 
among of them.  
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            Acharya et al. (2013) argue that large banks are less likely to fail due to government’s 
implicit subsidies. As our story lies in the association between the probability of failure and 
M&As, we attempt to bring too-big-to-fail issue into our empirical analysis and provide some 
novel findings. Following Acharya et al. (2013), we generate a dummy variable Size90 equal 
to 1 if banks are in the top 90th percentile in term of asset size and 0 otherwise to represent 
too-big-to-fail effect. We incorporate the interaction term of Size90*SBHC_affiliate and 
Size90*MBHC_affiliate into our main model. Our findings in Model (11)-(12) in Table 3 
shows that the interaction term of Size90*SBHC_affiliate and Size90*MBHC_affiliate are 
not statistically significant, implying that there is no difference of too-big-to-fail effects 
across bank groups.  
 
4.2 The likelihood of being acquirers 
 
4.2.1 Main findings 
Table 5 reports the findings for the likelihood of being acquirers. Models (1), (3), (5), 
(8) and (10) are original models whereas model (2), (4), (6), (9) and (11) are their corrected 
model, respectively. It should be noted that model (7) met the proportional hazard 
assumption; hence, there is no need for model replacement. The same test for 
nonproportionality was implemented as before and is reported in Table 6.  
As indicated in Model (1) and (2) of Table 5, we find that the coefficients of both 
SBHC_affiliate and MBHC_affiliate are positive and significant (0.54 and 2.02, 
respectively), indicating that both SBHC and MBHC affiliates are more likely to be acquirers 
than stand-alone banks5. These findings are consistent with our conjecture that with more 
internal resources (Stein 1997, Weston 1970) and capabilities to assess acquisition candidates 
(Teece 1982), diversified firms may own excess capacity in resources to fund their needs for 
economic activities and increased capabilities to evaluate expansion opportunities than does a 
focused firm. However, Martin and Sayrak (2003) argue that the potential costs related to 
diversified business operations determine the benefits of maintaining a specialized entity. 
Therefore, stand-alone commercial banks attempt to stay focused by reducing their likelihood 
of becoming targets. Our evidence leads to the conclusion that MBHC affiliates tend to 
possess a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do SBHC affiliates, which, in turn, have a 
greater likelihood of being acquirers than do stand-alone banks. 
                                                          
5 We applied similar robustness analyses and all the results are consistent in Poisson, Kaplan-Meier and 
Standard Mortality Ratio. The evidence can be provided upon the request. 
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Appendix C1 supplements the relative graphical approach for model 1 of Table 5 by 
plotting the scaled Schoenfeld residuals against ln(time)6. Most of lines through the residuals 
are constant over time except size and OBS, indicating that the agreement between the 
observed covariate and the proportional hazard assumption is fairly good. Appendix C2 that  
illustrates  cumulative Cox-Snell residuals obtained from Model (1) of Table 5 suggests 
afairly fit of the Cox model in the likelihood of being acquirers. Again, our model met the 
censoring condition.  
 
4.2.2 Financial crisis 2007-2009 
This section focuses on the sample that excludes the bank-year observations from 2007 
to 2009. Model (3) and (4) in Table 5 report the finding in terms  of the financial crisis 2007-
2009. We find that SBHC_affiliate and MBHC_affiliate coefficients are still positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Hence, we can conclude that there are no different 
reasons for M&A between the crisis and normal period.  
 
4.2.3 Asset size class and too-big-to-fail 
This section reports the results of the likelihood of being acquirers across different asset 
size classes and too-big-to-fail issue. As shown in Model (6), (7)7 and (9), all the findings are 
consistent across asset size. Model (10) and (11) of Table 5, interaction term of 
Size90*SBHC_affiliate and Size*MBHC_affiliate are insignificant, suggesting that the 
likelihood of being acquirers are not influenced by the implicit subsidies.  
 
4.3 The motivation of M&As occurred within the same MBHC structure 
The neo-classical theory for mergers contends that conglomerates reallocate 
inefficiently used assets via M&A and create operating synergies from new acquisitions 
(Maksimovic and Phillips 2002). Similar to the neo-classical theory, the auction theory, as 
modelled by Giliberto and Varaiya (1989), argues that if an acquirer is part of an MBHC, the 
acquirer will be better able to utilize the failed bank’s charter than will a non-MBHC 
counterpart. In fact, from Panels C and A in Table 1, respectively, we observe that 1,865 out 
of 2,318 MBHC affiliate targets (80.45%) were acquired by 1,124 MBHC affiliates within 
the same MBHC structure. Our observation suggests that there is a high tendency for MBHC 
affiliates to become targets or acquirers within the structure. 
                                                          
6 To save space, plots of scaled Schoenfeld residuals from other models are not reported. 
7 Model 7 passes the Schoenfeld residual-based nonproportionality test, so no corrected model is included. 
18 
 
To ascertain why banks conduct M&A within the same MBHC structure, we consider 
the issue from two different angles and conduct two probit model analyses. First, we compare 
the financial characteristics between acquirers who acquire another bank within the same 
MBHC structure (acquirers_within hereafter) and acquirers who acquire another bank outside 
the same MBHC structure (acquirers_outside hereafter). For this analysis, we focus on data 
of MBHC affiliates who are acquirers acquiring another bank within and outside the same 
MBHC structure. We code acquirers_within as 1 at the time when a bank acquires another 
bank from the same MBHC structure, and 0 otherwise, and  acquirers_outside as 1 at the time 
when a bank acquires another bank from outside the same MBHC structure, and 0 otherwise.  
Second, we examine the differences in the financial characteristics between targets who 
are acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure (targets_within hereafter) and 
targets who are acquired by another bank from outside the same MBHC structure 
(target_outside hereafter). For this analysis, we focus on data of MBHC affiliates who are 
targets being acquired by another bank within and outside the same MBHC structure. We 
code targets_within as 1 at the time when a bank is acquired by another bank from the same 
MBHC structure, and 0 otherwise, and targets_outside as 1 at the time when a bank is 
acquired by another bank from outside the same MBHC structure, and 0 otherwise.  
Our main financial characteristics are insolvency risk, ROA, capital ratio and bank size. 
Insolvency risk is measured by Z-score, which is calculated as ROA plus equity/assets 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on asset. The standard deviation of the return 
on asset is calculated at the four-year rolling time. ROA is profitability. Capital ratio is total 
equity divided by total assets. Size is logarithm of total asset. Tables 7 and 8 report results for 
the two above probit analyses, respectively.  
As indicated in Table 7, the coefficients on equity/assets and size are both negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that acquirers_within are more financially constrained 
and smaller than are acquirers_outside, indicating their limited ability to expand into outside 
targets. This finding is consistent with the view that larger banks tend to be acquirers 
(Wheelock and Wilson 2004, Andrade et al. 2001). Given that capital plays an important role 
in determining the successful outcome of the acquisition contest (Morellec and Zhdanov 
2008, Villalonga and Anita 2005), MBHC affiliates with superior capital resources tend to 
have greater ability to expand outside the structure.  
Table 8 indicates that within targets are smaller with higher ROA and capital than 
outside targets. In fact, Rodrigues et al. (2012) argue that the probability of being targets is 
influenced by acquirers who hold private information. Teece (1982) emphasizes that a 
conglomerate enhances the assessment of acquisition candidates as the inside acquirers 
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exploit information concerning the targets that is not available to outside acquirers (Halpern 
1982). Dutordoir et al. (2014) argue that asymmetric information may be higher for smaller 
targets and that information asymmetry related to the stand-alone value of targets restricts the 
abilities of acquirers to assess the combined values. Therefore, smaller targets_within have 
limited capacity to position themselves as attractive takeover targets from outsiders (Gorton 
et al. 2009). An observed higher ROA and capital of within targets could be the reason 
suggested by Eun (1996) that acquirers prefer to internalize the operating synergies obtained 
from the targets.  
 
4.4 Which banks are acquired within the MBHC 
Gertner et al. (1994) argue that conglomeration could be value enhancing. Comparing 
internal and external capital markets, they argue that conglomerates provide more advantages 
than do banks to efficiently redeploy poorly performing assets. Therefore, the MBHC parent 
regards M&A as an optimal solution to reduce the probability of default and increase debt 
capacity (Weston and Halpern 1983). The key issue examined in this section is to determine 
the types of banks that are acquired within the MBHCs. 
 In this section, we study data of MBHC affiliates who are acquired by another bank 
from the same MBHC structure (targets hereafter) and those MBHC affiliates who are not 
acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure (non-targets hereafter). We code a 
bank as 1 when it is acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure, and 0 
otherwise. We then study the determinants of the likelihood of being this target within the 
same MBHC structure using probit analysis. Our main financial characteristics are insolvency 
risk, ROA, equity/assets and bank size. Insolvency risk is measured using the Z-score, which 
is calculated as the ROA plus equity/assets divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. 
The standard deviation of the ROA is calculated at the four-year rolling time. ROA is 
profitability. Equity/assets are the total equity divided by total assets. Size is the logarithm of 
total asset. Table 9 reports our results. 
As indicated in the first column of Table 9, targets are more financially constrained 
than are non-targets. The MBHC parent tends to let financially distressed affiliates become 
targets to increase the holding company’s excess value (Billett and Mauer, 2003). From an 
internal capital market perspective, there is a tendency for the MBHC parent to divest 
financially distressed affiliates to reduce the cross-subsidization inside the internal capital 
market (Meyer et al., 1992). This finding is consistent with the failing hypothesis that 
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financially distressed banks are more like to be acquired (Peel and Wilson 1989, Pastena and 
Ruland 1986, Bulow and John 1978, Lee and Barker 1977, Higgins and Schall 1975). 
Significantly negative coefficients of ROA and size indicate that targets perform more 
poorly and are smaller than are the non-targets. These findings suggest that the motive of the 
MBHC parent is to discipline poorly performing and smaller affiliates to centralize certain 
operations within a holding company organization, improve efficiency and achieve cost 
reductions.  
Overall, our findings lead to a firm conclusion that is consistent with evidence provided 
by Koetter et al. (2007), that is, banks with relatively bad financial profiles tend to be 
acquired. Firms choose to merge within the same organization to reduce transaction costs as 
the cost of doing so is less than the costs associated with using the market (Coase 1937), 
diversifying the corporation, refocusing (Campa and Kedia 2002) and increasing internal 
efficiency (Villalonga and Anita 2005, Andrade et al. 2001, Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
Therefore, the MBHC parent’s attempt to replicate the M&A strategy inside the MBHC to 
reduce transaction costs, refocus, and increase the overall performance of the MBHC at the 
parent level.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The U.S. banking industry has experienced rapid consolidation with conglomerate 
targets and conglomerate acquirers over the past two decades. This paper uses U.S 
commercial bank data from 1997 to 2012 and the Cox proportional hazards model to study 
the likelihood of being targets or acquirers among stand-alone banks, SBHC affiliates, and 
MBHC affiliates. We find that MBHC affiliates tend to exhibit a greater likelihood of being 
targets than do stand-alone commercial banks, which demonstrate a greater likelihood of 
being targets than do SBHC affiliates. On the other hand, our findings show that MBHC 
affiliates tend to exhibit a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do SBHC affiliates, 
which, in turn, demonstrate a greater likelihood of being acquirers than do stand-alone banks. 
Our results are consistent with our two main hypotheses. Therefore, we conclude that failing 
banks tend to seek M&A for survival, whereas SBHC and MBHC affiliates that choose to 
diversify by M&A and the stand-alone counterparts choose to maintain their specialized 
structures.  
Those banks that acquire another bank within the same MBHC structure tend to be 
smaller and more financially constrained than those banks that acquire another bank outside 
the same MBHC structure, whereas targets that are acquired by another bank within the same 
MBHC structure tend to be smaller with higher profitability and capital than the targets that 
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are acquired by another bank from outside the same MBHC structure. Our results suggest that 
the MBHC parent attempts to discipline distressed, poorly performing and  smaller affiliates 
by engaging them in mergers and acquisitions. Overall, the MBHC parents attempt to 
replicate the M&A strategy inside the MBHC to reduce transaction costs and refocus and 
increase the overall performance of the MBHC at the parent level. 
Our study contributes to our understanding of the restructuring of the U.S. banking 
industry and explains why the stand-alone bank model is disappearing. In addition, we 
provide the regulators with new information on different acquisition decisions among stand-
alone banks and BHC affiliates and offer implications when anticipating future merger  
waves and adopting new policies for merger activities.  
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Table 1 
          
Distribution of acquirers and targets      
Panel A: Distribution of acquirers and targets across three types of banks 
Targets 
Acquirers 
Total Stand-alone banks 
 
SBHC affiliates 
 
MBHC affiliates 
N Percent   N Percent   N Percent 
Stand-alone banks 36 7.89%  204 44.74%  216 47.37% 456 
SBHC affiliates 18 1.77%  374 36.77%  625 61.46% 1,017 
MBHC affiliates 8 0.33%  104 4.28%  2,318 95.39% 2,430 
Total 62   682   3,159  3,903 
Panel B: Distribution of acquirers within the same MBHC structure 
Total 1,124              
Panel C: Distribution of targets within the same MBHC structure 
Total 1,865             
Note: Table reports the number of targets and acquirers for each type of banks from 1997 to 2012.  Panel A 
displays distribution of targets and acquirers across three types of banks, including stand-alone banks, SBHC 
affiliates and MBHC affiliates. In panel A, it is noted that acquirers are counted by the number of M&A 
transactions to acquire a certain type of targets. Panel B and C present the number of acquirers and targets 
within the same MBHC structure, respectively.  
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Table 2                  
Summary statistics     
Variable  All banks   Stand-alone banks   SBHC affiliates   MBHC affiliates t-test for difference  
in means  Obs  Mean Std    Obs Mean Std    Obs Mean Std    Obs Mean Std 
Target sample 
Z-score 22,677 67.35 64.08  3,338 69.93 73.85  7,821 70.25 66.92  11,518 64.64 58.73 b, c 
Size 22,677 11.73 1.39  3,338 11.16 1.06  7,821 11.63 1.27  11,518 11.98 1.49 a, b, c 
Equity/ assets 22,677 0.1 0.04  3,338 0.11 0.04  7,821 0.09 0.03  11,518 0.1 0.04 a, b, c 
Deposit 22,677 0.83 0.1  3,338 0.85 0.09  7,821 0.85 0.07  11,518 0.81 0.12 a, b, c 
OBS  22,677 0.02 0.03  3,338 0.01 0.02  7,821 0.02 0.02  11,518 0.02 0.03 a, b, c 
Cost-to-income  22,677 0.88 0.76  3,338 1.14 1.06  7,821 0.92 0.72  11,518 0.78 0.66 a, b, c 
Real estate loans 22,677 0.39 0.17  3,338 0.37 0.18  7,821 0.39 0.16  11,518 0.4 0.17 a, b 
Multi- family mortgages 22,677 0.17 0.11  3,338 0.14 0.11  7,821 0.16 0.11  11,518 0.18 0.11 a, b, c 
Liquidity 22,677 0.29 0.15  3,338 0.29 0.15  7,821 0.29 0.14  11,518 0.28 0.15 a, b, c 
                  Acquirer sample 
Z-score 20,166 72.95 66.77  1,174 64.64 69.36  11,128 74.68 69  7,864 71.75 62.93 a, b, c 
Size 20,166 12.77 1.48  1,174 11.77 1.34  11,128 12.79 1.33  7,864 12.89 1.64 a, b, c 
Equity/ assets 20,166 0.1 0.03  1,174 0.12 0.05  11,128 0.09 0.02  7,864 0.09 0.03 a, b 
Deposit 20,166 0.81 0.09  1,174 0.81 0.13  11,128 0.82 0.07  7,864 0.79 0.11 a, b, c 
OBS  20,166 0.02 0.03  1,174 0.02 0.02  11,128 0.02 0.03  7,864 0.03 0.04 a, b, c 
Cost-to-income  20,166 0.94 0.79  1,174 1.05 0.95  11,128 0.99 0.81  7,864 0.85 0.73 b, c 
Real estate loans 20,166 0.42 0.16  1,174 0.37 0.2  11,128 0.44 0.15  7,864 0.41 0.16 a, b, c 
Multi- family mortgages 20,166 0.15 0.09  1,174 0.13 0.11  11,128 0.16 0.09  7,864 0.16 0.09 a, b 
Liquidity 20,166 0.27 0.13  1,174 0.29 0.16  11,128 0.27 0.12  7,864 0.26 0.13 a, b, c 
                 Note: This table provides summary of statistics for target and acquirer sample. It describes number of observations, means and standard deviations on all the regression variables for all banks, stand-
alone banks, SBHC-affiliated banks and MBHC-affiliated banks. Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is 
calculated at four-year rolling time. Size is logarithm of total asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet 
activities divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Real estate loans are the ratio of real-estate loans to total assets. Multi-family mortgages are 
the ratio of multi-family mortgages to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. . In the last column, the letter "a", "b" and "c" indicates a significant difference of mean at 1% level 
between each pair, respectively as follows:  (i) single-holding company's banks and stand-alone banks; (ii) multi-bank holding company's banks and stand-alone banks; (iii) multi- and single-bank 
holding company's affiliates.  
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Table 3 
                 Cox proportional hazard estimations for the likelihood of being targets: the U.S. banking industry 
                           Variable Main finding   Crisis 2007-2009  Asset size   Too-big-to-fail 
 
 < $1 billion 
 
$1 - $3 billion 
 
> $3 billion 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10)  (11) (12) 
SBHC_affiliate -0.11* -0.13** 
 
-0.11* -0.13** 
 
-0.16*** -0.17*** 
 
0.70 0.65 
 
0.62 0.64 
 
-0.16** -0.17*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.54) (0.53) 
 
(0.60) (0.60) 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
MBHC_affiliate 1.58*** 1.61*** 
 
1.52*** 1.66*** 
 
1.58*** 1.61*** 
 
1.98*** 1.93*** 
 
2.30*** 2.33*** 
 
1.64*** 1.63*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) 
 
(0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.53) (0.52) 
 
(0.56) (0.56) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Z-score -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
-0.00 -0.00 
 
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Size 0.11*** 0.15*** 
 
0.07*** 0.11*** 
 
0.11*** 0.24*** 
 
1.04*** 0.99*** 
 
0.34 0.25 
   
 
(0.01) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) 
 
(0.20) (0.20) 
 
(0.20) (0.21) 
   Equity/ assets 0.21 0.44 
 
-0.38 -0.03 
 
-0.32 -0.16 
 
-0.93 -12.97** 2.65 -9.40* 
 
-0.43 -2.93** 
 
(0.57) (0.59) 
 
(0.65) (0.64) 
 
(0.63) (0.66) 
 
(2.24) (5.45) 
 
(1.92) (5.54) 
 
(0.58) (1.23) 
Deposit 0.90*** 0.65*** 
 
0.27 0.29 
 
0.91*** 0.63*** 
 
0.39 0.44 
 
0.81 0.93* 
 
0.47** -0.07 
 
(0.19) (0.20) 
 
(0.21) (0.21) 
 
(0.22) (0.23) 
 
(0.57) (0.57) 
 
(0.55) (0.54) 
 
(0.19) (0.37) 
OBS  0.19 0.82 
 
1.69** 1.70** 
 
0.34 0.98 
 
4.97*** 4.55** 
 
3.47* 3.30* 
 
1.71*** 3.59*** 
 
(0.64) (0.68) 
 
(0.73) (0.71) 
 
(0.80) (0.84) 
 
(1.85) (1.84) 
 
(1.81) (1.78) 
 
(0.65) (1.11) 
Cost-to-income  0.03* -0.17*** 0.01 -0.18*** 
 
0.04** -0.14*** 
 
-0.28** -0.28** 
 
-0.06 -0.06 
 
0.04** -0.16*** 
 
(0.02) (0.05) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) 
 
(0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.08) (0.09) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) 
Real estate loans 0.22* -0.55** 
 
0.39** -0.55** 
 
0.22 -0.95*** 
 
-1.14* -4.08*** -1.75*** -5.47*** 0.28* -0.80*** 
 
(0.13) (0.27) 
 
(0.16) (0.24) 
 
(0.15) (0.25) 
 
(0.60) (0.95) 
 
(0.66) (1.13) 
 
(0.14) (0.24) 
Multi- family mortgages 0.43** 0.35* 
 
-0.02 0.00 
 
0.42** 0.30 
 
3.14*** 3.19*** 
 
1.87* 2.24** 
 
0.35* 0.39** 
 
(0.18) (0.19) 
 
(0.21) (0.21) 
 
(0.19) (0.21) 
 
(0.77) (0.78) 
 
(0.96) (0.96) 
 
(0.19) (0.19) 
Liquidity 0.78*** 1.21*** 
 
0.70*** 0.77*** 
 
0.82*** 0.84*** 
 
1.06* 1.15* 
 
-0.09 -0.04 
 
0.72*** 0.80*** 
 (0.13) (0.29) 
 
(0.15) (0.15) 
 
(0.14) (0.15) 
 
(0.62) (0.63) 
 
(0.53) (0.52) 
 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Size90 
               
0.17 0.18 
 
               
(0.26) (0.26) 
Size90 x SBHC_affiliate 
               
0.40 0.39 
 
               
(0.28) (0.28) 
Size90 x MBHC_affiliate 
               
-0.02 -0.05 
 
               
(0.27) (0.27) 
ln(time) x MBHC_affiliate 
    
-0.11** 
             
    
(0.05) 
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Table 3 
                 Cox proportional hazard estimations for the likelihood of being targets: the U.S. banking industry 
                           Variable Main finding   Crisis 2007-2009  Asset size   Too-big-to-fail 
 
 < $1 billion 
 
$1 - $3 billion 
 
> $3 billion 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10)  (11) (12) 
ln(time) x Size 
 
-0.04*** 
 
-0.03* 
  
-0.11*** 
          
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
         ln(time) x Equity/assets 
          
7.56*** 
  
6.98** 
  
1.80*** 
 
          
(2.78) 
  
(2.77) 
  
(0.68) 
ln(time) x Deposit 
                
0.37* 
 
                
(0.22) 
ln(time) x OBS 
                
-1.23* 
 
                
(0.64) 
ln(time) x Cost-to-income 
 
0.11*** 
  
0.11*** 
  
0.10*** 
        
0.11*** 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
        
(0.02) 
ln(time) x Real estate loans 
 
0.52*** 
  
0.68*** 
  
0.82*** 
  
1.99*** 
  
2.02*** 
  
0.71*** 
 
 
(0.15) 
  
(0.13) 
  
(0.12) 
  
(0.54) 
  
(0.54) 
  
(0.12) 
ln(time) x Multi- family mortgages 
                  
                 ln(time) x liquidity 
 
-0.28 
                
 
(0.17) 
                                 No of targets 3,903 3,903 
 
2,897 2,887 
 
3,505 3,505 
 
196 196 
 
159 159 
 
3,903 3,903 
No of banks 10,847 10,847 
 
10,212      10,212 
 
10,439 10,439 
 
805 805 
 
419 419 
 
10,847 10,847 
No of observations 114,740 114,740   86,056 86,056   107,835 107,835   3,932 3,932   2,615 2,615   114,740 114,740 
Note: The table presents the likelihood of being targets between (i) SBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks; (ii) MBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks. SBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are SBHC affiliates and 0 
otherwise. MBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are MBHC affiliates and 0 otherwise. Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is 
calculated at four-year rolling time. Size is logarithm of total asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet activities 
divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Real-estate loans are the ratio of real-estate mortgage to total assets. Multi-family mortgages are the ratio of multi-
family mortgage to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size90 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given bank's size is in the top 90th percentile. Two interaction terms of 
Size90*SBHC_affiliate and Size90*MBHC_affiliate are included to investigate too-big-to-fail issues. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the bank level, are used to calculate the P-
values. Models (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) are adjusted for nonproportionality in the original models by interacting ln(Time) with violating variables. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
                       Results of Schoenfeld residual-based nonproportionality tests - The likelihood of being targets 
            
                          From Model (1)   From Model (3)   From Model (5)   From Model (7)   From Model (9)   From Model (11) 
  
ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
SBHC_affiliate -0.02 1.63 0.20 
 
-0.03 2.31 0.13 
 
-0.02 1.85 0.17 
 
0.11 2.55 0.11 
 
0.00 0.00 0.95 
 
-0.02 1.47 0.23 
MBHC_affiliate 0.02 2.38 0.12 
 
-0.04 5.65 0.02 
 
0.02 2.33 0.13 
 
0.11 2.63 0.10 
 
-0.02 0.05 0.82 
 
0.00 0.10 0.75 
Z-score -0.02 1.37 0.23 
 
0.01 0.29 0.59 
 
0.00 0.06 0.80 
 
-0.05 1.15 0.28 
 
-0.13 2.87 0.09 
 
-0.01 0.72 0.39 
Size -0.06 13.28 0.00 
 
-0.04 4.67 0.03 
 
-0.08 25.20 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.95 
 
-0.03 0.10 0.75 
    Equity/ assets 0.02 1.84 0.17 
 
-0.01 0.34 0.56 
 
0.01 0.44 0.51 
 
0.12 3.71 0.05 
 
0.12 3.41 0.06 
 
0.03 5.61 0.02 
Deposit -0.01 0.30 0.58 
 
-0.02 0.98 0.32 
 
0.00 0.00 0.95 
 
-0.11 1.39 0.24 
 
0.09 1.10 0.29 
 
0.03 2.86 0.09 
OBS  0.00 0.04 0.84 
 
-0.02 0.91 0.34 
 
-0.01 0.60 0.44 
 
-0.05 0.40 0.53 
 
-0.15 3.15 0.1 
 
-0.04 3.92 0.05 
Cost-to-income  0.07 19.06 0.00 
 
0.07 13.92 0.00 
 
0.07 17.94 0.00 
 
0.09 1.88 0.17 
 
0.00 0.00 0.96 
 
0.06 13.99 0.00 
Real estate loans 0.03 2.80 0.09 
 
0.05 6.75 0.40 
 
0.05 8.92 0.003 
 
0.19 7.11 0.01 
 
0.17 2.81 0.09 
 
0.04 4.16 0.04 
Multi- family mortgages 0.00 0.02 0.89 
 
-0.01 0.71 0.24 
 
-0.01 0.21 0.65 
 
-0.09 2.01 0.16 
 
-0.04 0.29 0.59 
 
0.01 0.28 0.59 
Liquidity -0.03 3.73 0.05 
 
-0.02 1.35 0.24 
 
-0.01 0.62 0.43 
 
-0.04 0.33 0.57 
 
-0.07 0.59 0.44 
 
-0.03 2.13 0.14 
Size90 
                    
-0.02 1.09 0.29 
Size90 x SBHC_affiliate 
                    
0.00 0.03 0.85 
Size90 x MBHC_affiliate 
                    
0.01 0.62 0.43 
Global Test   89.13  0.00     53.57 0.00     94.88 0.00     24.65 0.01 
 
  23.61 0.01 
 
  72.22 0.00 
Note: This table reports Schoenfeld residual-based test for the possibility of nonproportionality in the findings of the likelihood of being targets. Results are based on models presented in Table 3 and are for log-
time specification.  ρ presents the estimated correlation between scaled residuals and ln(time). χ2 and p-value report the confidence to reject the null hypothesis that the hazard ratios for values of covariates are 
constant over time.  
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Table 5 
                Cox proportional hazard estimations for the likelihood of being acquirers: the U.S. banking industry 
                       Variable Main finding   Crisis 2007-2009  Asset size   Too-big-to-fail 
 
 < $1 billion   $1 - $3 billion 
 
> $3 billion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
SBHC_affiliate 0.55*** 0.54*** 
 
0.54*** 0.54*** 
 
0.46*** 0.46*** 
 
1.14** 
 
0.75 0.79* 
 
0.57*** 0.56*** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.47) (0.48) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
MBHC_affiliate 2.02*** 2.02*** 
 
1.98*** 1.97*** 
 
1.99*** 1.99*** 
 
2.11*** 
 
1.43*** 1.44*** 
 
2.17*** 2.16*** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.46) (0.46) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Z-score 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
0.00** 0.00** 
 
0.00*** 
 
0.00*** -0.00 
 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Size 0.48*** 0.58*** 
 
0.48*** 0.57*** 
 
0.64*** 0.85*** 
 
1.49*** 
 
0.59*** 0.62*** 
  
-9.60*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.22) (0.23) 
  
(1.96) 
Equity/ assets -3.36*** -3.43*** 
 
-2.85*** -2.95*** 
 
-2.81*** -2.87*** 
 
-5.00* 
 
-7.91*** -6.97*** 
 
-6.34*** -0.55** 
 
(0.95) (0.96) 
 
(1.01) (1.03) 
 
(1.03) (1.03) 
 
(2.55) 
 
(2.33) (2.28) 
 
(0.93) (0.26) 
Deposit 0.79*** 0.84*** 
 
0.72** 0.76** 
 
0.20 0.18 
 
0.80 
 
0.71 1.06* 
 
-0.55** -2.60 
 
(0.30) (0.30) 
 
(0.32) (0.32) 
 
(0.34) (0.33) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.61) (0.61) 
 
(0.26) (2.00) 
OBS  -2.46** -9.79*** 
 
-2.08* -9.56*** 
 
-1.79 -14.77*** -1.63 
 
2.48 2.26 
 
2.02** -0.18*** 
 
(1.07) (2.04) 
 
(1.10) (2.11) 
 
(1.39) (3.33) 
 
(2.22) 
 
(2.00) (1.99) 
 
(1.00) (0.05) 
Cost-to-income  -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
-0.16*** -0.17*** 
 
-0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
-0.62*** 
 
-0.03 -0.04 
 
-0.19*** 0.40** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.05) (0.20) 
Real estate loans 0.31 0.31 
 
0.37* 0.35 
 
-0.56** -0.47** 
 
-0.24 
 
0.32 -2.51** 
 
0.40** -1.38*** 
 
(0.20) (0.20) 
 
(0.22) (0.22) 
 
(0.23) (0.23) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.64) (1.00) 
 
(0.20) (0.30) 
Multi- family mortgages -1.57*** -1.56*** 
 
-1.80*** -1.77*** 
 
-1.15*** -1.26*** 
 
0.74 
 
-0.21 -0.30 
 
-1.36*** -0.38* 
 
(0.29) (0.30) 
 
(0.32) (0.32) 
 
(0.33) (0.33) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.92) (0.96) 
 
(0.30) (0.21) 
Liquidity -0.43** -0.41* 
 
-0.53** -0.50** 
 
-0.77*** -0.73*** 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.62 -0.35 
 
-0.39* 1.59*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
 
(0.23) (0.23) 
 
(0.23) (0.23) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.62) (0.60) 
 
(0.21) (0.29) 
Size90 
              
1.62*** 1.59**** 
 
              
(0.29) (0.29) 
Size90 x SBHC_affiliate 
              
-0.20 -0.18 
 
              
(0.31) (0.31) 
Size90 x MBHC_affiliate 
              
-0.75** -0.40 
 
              
(0.30) (0.33) 
ln(time) x Zscore 
            
0.00*** 
    
            
(0.00) 
   ln(time) x Size 
 
-0.73*** 
  
-0.06*** 
  
-0.14*** 
         
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.04) 
        ln(time) x Equity/ assets 
               
2.04** 
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Table 5 
                Cox proportional hazard estimations for the likelihood of being acquirers: the U.S. banking industry 
                       Variable Main finding   Crisis 2007-2009  Asset size   Too-big-to-fail 
 
 < $1 billion   $1 - $3 billion 
 
> $3 billion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
               
(1.00) 
ln(time) x OBS 
 
4.97*** 
  
5.53*** 
  
7.88*** 
       
3.05*** 
 
 
(1.19) 
  
(1.31) 
  
(1.79) 
       
(1.17) 
ln(time) x Real estate loans 
            
1.88*** 
    
            
(0.50) 
   ln(time) x Multi- family 
mortgages 
                 
                ln(time) x Size90 x MBHC_affiliate 
              
-0.21** 
 
               
(0.10) 
                 No of acquirers 1,325 1,325 
 
1,166 1,166 
 
1,143 1,143 
 
214 
 
137 137 
 
1,325 1,325 
No of banks 10,032 10,032 
 
9,957 9,957 
 
9,696   9,696   
 
785 
 
369 369 
 
10,032 10,032 
No of observations 94,553 94,553   77,882 77,882   91,587 91,587   3,107   1,422 1,422   94,553 94,553 
Note: The table presents the likelihood of being targets between (i) SBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks; (ii) MBHC affiliates and stand-alone banks. SBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are SBHC affiliates and 0 
otherwise. MBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are MBHC affiliates and 0 otherwise. Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is 
calculated at four-year rolling time. Size is logarithm of total asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet activities 
divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Real-estate loans are the ratio of real-estate mortgage to total assets. Multi-family mortgages are the ratio of multi-
family mortgage to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size90 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given bank's size is in the top 90th percentile. Two interaction terms of 
Size90*SBHC_affiliate and Size90*MBHC_affiliate are included to investigate too-big-to-fail issues. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the bank level, are used to calculate the p-
values. Models (2), (4), (6), (9) and (11) are adjusted for nonproportionality in the original models by .0interacting ln(Time) and violating variables. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6                       
Results of Schoenfeld residuals nonproportionality tests - The likelihood of being acquirers           
                          From Model (1) From Model (3)   From Model (5)   From Model (7)   From Model (8)   From Model (10) 
 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value 
  ρ χ2 p-
value  
SBHC_affiliate -0.03 1.34 0.25 -0.03 1.22 0.27  -0.03 1.16 0.28  -0.1 1.01 0.32  -0.05 0.48 0.49  -0.00 0.01 0.92 
 
MBHC_affiliate -0.02 0.49 0.48 -0.04 1.91 0.17  -0.02 0.28 0.59  0 0.19 0.67  -0.12 2.43 0.12  0.01 0.19 0.66 
 
Z-score 0.02 0.4 0.53 0.017 0.28 0.59  0.01 0.12 0.73  -0.1 0.36 0.55  0.19 4.82 0.03  0.01 0.06 0.80 
 
Size -0.08 9.03 0.00 -0.06 4.67 0.03  -0.08 8.86 0.00  -0.1 1.82 0.18  -0.08 0.78 0.38     
 
Equity/ assets 0.02 0.77 0.38 0.041 1.9 0.17  0.03 0.77 0.38  0.03 0.27 0.61  0.16 2.67 0.1  0.05 2.90 0.09 
 
Deposit -0.03 0.82 0.36 -0.02 0.55 0.46  -0.01 0.06 0.81  0.08 1.11 0.29  -0.12 1.59 0.21  0.03 0.81 0.37 
 
OBS  0.11 15.1 0.00 0.119 16 0.00  0.11 14.5 0.00  -0.1 2.38 0.12  0.18 4.00 0.1  0.05 3.87 0.05 
 
Cost-to-income  0.04 1.75 0.19 0.037 1.63 0.2  0.04 1.59 0.21  0.06 0.63 0.43  0.02 0.06 0.8  0.05 3.29 0.07 
 
Real estate loans 0.04 1.39 0.24 0.036 1.05 0.31  0.01 0.05 0.82  0.13 2.63 0.1  0.29 9.01 0.00  0.05 2.38 0.12 
 
Multi- family mortgages 0.01 0.11 0.73 -0.01 0.03 0.87  0.02 0.57 0.45  -0.1 2.63 0.39  -0.12 2.01 0.16  0.00 0.01 0.92 
 
Liquidity 0.03 0.95 0.33 0.025 0.61 0.44  0.02 0.3 0.58  -0.1 0.73 0.46  0.15 2.31 0.13  0.04 1.34 0.25 
 
Size90                    0.04 2.29 0.13 
 
Size90 x SBHC_affiliate                    -0.04 2.66 0.10 
 
Size90 x MBHC_affiliate                    -0.05 3.71 0.05 
 
Global Test   89.13  0.00   26.64 0.00     28.32 0.00     15.6 0.16    31.8 0.00     21.14 0.07 
 
Note: This table reports Schoenfeld residual-based test for the possibility of nonproportionality in the findings of the likelihood of being acquirers. Results are based on models presented in Table 5 and are for log-
time specification.  ρ presents the estimated correlation between scaled residuals and ln(time). χ2 and p-value report the confidence to reject the null hypothesis that the hazard ratios for values of covariates are 
constant over time.   
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Table 7 
    Probit model analysis: acquirers_within versus acquirers_outside 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Z-scoret-1 0.00 
   
 
(0.00) 
   ROAt-1 
 
-0.06 
  
 
 
(0.08) 
  Equity/ assetst-1 
  
-4.99*** 
 
 
  
(1.53) 
 Sizet-1 -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.22*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Depositt-1 -0.30 -0.33 -0.76 -0.30 
 
(0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) 
OBSt-1 1.28 1.17 1.04 1.26 
 
(1.30) (1.30) (1.28) (1.29) 
Cost-to-incomet-1  -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Real estate loanst-1 -0.35 -0.38 -0.45 -0.35 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
Multi- family mortgagest-1 1.01* 1.02* 0.85 1.02* 
 
(0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Liquidityt-1 0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.07 
 
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
Constantt-1 3.49*** 3.64*** 4.72*** 3.50*** 
 
(0.71) (0.73) (0.81) (0.71) 
     Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.075 0.082 0.075 
Number of observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 
Note: This table reports the results of a probit model analysis for the difference in financial 
characteristics between acquirers who acquirer another bank within the same MBHC structure 
(acquirer_within hereafter) and acquirers who acquire another bank outside the same MBHC structure 
(acquirer_outside hereafter), including Z-score, ROA, equity/assets and size. This analysis focuses on 
data of MBHC affiliates who are acquirers acquiring another bank within and outside the same MBHC 
structure. We code acquirers_within as 1 at the time when a bank acquires another bank from the same 
MBHC structure and 0 otherwise, and acquirers_outside as 1 at the time when a bank acquires another 
bank from outside the same MBHC structure and 0 otherwise. Z-score equals to (return on assets + 
capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is calculated at 
four-year rolling time. ROA is return on asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Size 
is logarithm of total asset. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet 
activities divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating 
income. Real-estate loans are the ratio of real-estate mortgage to total assets. Multi-family mortgages are 
the ratio of multi-family mortgages to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported 
in the parentheses. The results for time fixed effects are not reported in the table. ***,** and * denote 
1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively.  
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Table 8 
    Probit model analysis: targets_within versus targets_outside 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Z-scoret-1 0.00 
   
 
(0.00) 
   ROAt-1 
 
0.09* 
  
 
 
(0.05) 
  Equity/ assetst-1 
  
2.28** 
 
 
  
(1.02) 
 Sizet-1 -0.05* -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Depositt-1 -0.66* -0.57 -0.27 -0.65* 
 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.35) 
OBSt-1 1.06 1.03 1.11 1.03 
 
(1.18) (1.18) (1.19) (1.18) 
Cost-to-incomet-1  -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Real estate loanst-1 -0.94*** -0.89*** -0.93*** -0.94*** 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Multi- family 
mortgagest-1 1.55*** 1.56*** 1.71*** 1.56*** 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Constantt-1 1.94*** 1.76*** 1.22** 1.96*** 
 
(0.53) (0.54) (0.60) (0.53) 
     Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.049 0.050 0.051  0.049 
Number of observations 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 
Note: This table reports the results of a probit model analysis for the difference in financial 
characteristics between targets who are acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure 
(targets_within hereafter) and targets who are acquired by another bank from outside the same 
MBHC structure (targets_outside hereafter), including Z-score, ROA, equity/assets and size. This 
analysis focuses on data of MBHC affiliates who are targets being acquired by another bank 
within and outside the same MBHC structure. We code targets_within as 1 at the time when a 
bank is acquired by another bank from the same MBHC structure and 0 otherwise, and 
targets_outside as 1 at the time when a bank is acquired by another bank from outside the same 
MBHC structure and 0 otherwise.  Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard 
deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is calculated at four-year rolling 
time. ROA is return on asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Size is 
logarithm of total asset. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-
sheet activities divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by 
operating income. Real-estate mortgages are the ratio of real-estate mortgage to total assets. 
Multi-family mortgages are the ratio of multi-family mortgages to total assets. Liquidity is the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. We include year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in the parentheses. The results for time fixed 
effects are not reported in the table. ***,** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, 
respectively.  
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Table 9 
    Probit model analysis: targets_within versus targets_outside 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Z-score -0.00*** 
   
 
(0.00) 
   ROA 
 
-0.14*** 
  
 
 
(0.03) 
  Equity/ assets 
  
-0.29 
 
 
  
(0.78) 
 Size -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Deposit -0.68*** -0.89*** -0.75*** -0.69*** 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) 
OBS 5.57*** 5.76*** 5.72*** 5.73*** 
 
(0.91) (0.92) (0.91) (0.91) 
Cost-to-income -0.08** -0.10*** -0.05 -0.05 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Real estate loans -0.16 -0.20 -0.13 -0.12 
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Multi- family mortgages 1.58*** 1.57*** 1.51*** 1.52*** 
 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) 
Liquidity 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant 3.41*** 3.71*** 3.39*** 3.29*** 
 
(0.39) (0.42) (0.47) (0.39) 
     Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.120 0.117 0.116 
Number of observations 20,390 20,390 20,390 20,390 
Note: This table reports the results of a probit model analysis to examine the determinants of 
the likelihood of being targets within the same MBHC structure, including Z-score, ROA, 
equity/assets and size. This analysis studies data of MBHC affiliates who are acquired by 
another bank from the same MBHC structure and those MBHC affiliates who are not acquired 
by another bank from the same MBHC structure. We code a bank as 1 when it is acquired by 
another bank from the same MBHC structure, and 0 otherwise. Z-score equals to (return on 
assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on 
asset is calculated at four-year rolling time. ROA is return on asset. Equity/assets are total 
equity divided by total assets. Size is logarithm of total asset. Deposit ratio is total deposits 
divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. Cost-to-
income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Real-estate loans are the 
ratio of real-estate mortgage to total assets. Multi-family mortgages are the ratio of multi-
family mortgages to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level 
and reported in the parentheses. The results for time fixed effects are not reported in the table. 
***,** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively.  
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APPENDIX A 
Correlation matrix 
           Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) SBHC_affiliate 1 
          (2) MBHC_affiliate -0.66* 1 
         (3) Z-score 0.02* -0.03* 1 
        (4) Size 0.04* 0.12* -0.03* 1 
       (5) Equity/ assets -0.15* -0.02* 0.17* -0.19* 1 
      (6) Deposit 0.12* -0.13* -0.02* -0.25* -0.46* 1 
     (7) OBS  -0.05* 0.13* -0.07* 0.47* -0.08* -0.15* 1 
    (8) Cost-to-income  0.01* -0.09* -0.18* -0.09* 0.09* -0.01* -0.00 1 
   (9) Real estate loans 0.07* -0.01 -0.09* 0.298 -0.29* 0.09* 0.19* -0.02* 1 
  (10) Multi- family mortgages 0.06* -0.0005 0.07* 0.06* -0.19* 0.07* -0.03* -0.07* 0.56* 1 
 (11) Liquidity -0.01* -0.03* 0.06* -0.17* 0.19* -0.05* -0.16* 0.13* -0.56* -0.29* 1 
Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is calculated at four-year rolling time. ROA is return on 
asset. Equity/assets are total equity divided by total assets. Size is logarithm of total asset. Deposit ratio is total deposits divided by total assets. OBS is off-balance-sheet activities 
divided by total assets. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Real-estate loans are the ratio of real-estate loans to total assets. Multi-family 
mortgages are the ratio of multi-family mortgages to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. * denotes significance at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
B1. Plots of scaled Schoenfeld residuals against ln(Time), model with targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures plot scale Schoefeld residuals obtained from Model (1) Table 3 against ln(Time). Red lines 
represent fitted value whereas lowness smooth curves are in green.  
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B2 Plots of cumulative Cox-Snell residuals, model with targets 
 
 
Note: Figures plot the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals obtained from Model (1) Table 3 
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APPENDIX C 
 
C1. Plots of scaled Schoenfeld residuals against ln(Time), model with acquirers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures plot scale Schoenfeld resudals obtained from Model (1) Table 5 against ln(Time). Red lines 
represent fitted value whereas lowness smooth curves are in green.  
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C2. Plots of cumulative Cox-Snell residuals, model with targets 
 
 
  
Note: Figures plot the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals obtained from Model (1) Table 5 
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